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1 Introduction
Investors weigh a variety of factors when they make 
choices. One of these factors concerns how risky an 
investment is. While risk can come in many forms, one 
form that seems to be of utmost relevance for renew-
able energy and clean technology investments is policy 
risk. Policy risk, or regulatory risk, concerns the risk that 
unexpected changes to government regulations and 
policies will change the investment environment. 
Traditionally, policy risk has been managed by investors 
with their own internal resources1 or partially covered 
under traditional political risk insurance products.2 
However, recent unprecedented retroactive cuts and 
amendments to public policies such as Feed-in-Tariffs 
(FiTs) have significantly increased perception of policy 
risk (MIGA, 2012e) and dented investors’ confidence in 
the renewable energy sector. The fact that demand for 
policy risk coverage is, so far, only partially met (Frisari 
et al., 2013), suggests that conventional practices may 
no longer be adequate to mitigate this risk and new miti-
gation instruments are needed. 
In this paper, we highlight elements integral to the effec-
tiveness of instruments which seek to address policy 
risk, paying special attention to issues likely to challenge 
their implementation, and we try to understand whether 
new instruments could themselves create additional 
risks. We provide a framework for a more accurate 
definition of policy risk in chapter two. In chapters three 
and four, we describe how existing and recently pro-
posed (or launched) insurance instruments provided by 
the public sector are addressing retroactive policy risk. 
Finally, in chapter five, we identify good practices and 
emerging needs for new instruments, with a partic-
ular focus on the mechanisms addressing FiT policy 
changes.3
1 We refer to due diligence practices for the assessment of the investment, 
which take into account potential future changes in legislation, and 
defence of private interests with the local authorities. Other solutions may 
entail engaging in social activities to involve local communities (Bremmer, 
Fareed, 2006), co-financing of projects with host governments, or use of 
joint ventures and alliances with local companies (MIGA, 2012e), which 
ultimately reduce the likelihood of governments’ breach of contract.
2 Policy Risk can fall within traditional political risk insurance coverage 
if changes are large enough to qualify as Expropriations or Regulatory 
takings (OPIC, 2012f).
3 Most of the recent reviews and amendments to support policies have 
concerned FiT schemes, especially in developed markets. Regulatory 
changes in the FiT regime are the result of democratic process and politi-
cal will, and are more probable to occur when: (1) Incentives per electricity 
generated are high, and more than cover market costs or the value of 
total generation (IEA, 2011b); (2) Subsidies represent a significant share 
Like the other Risk Gaps reports (Frisari et al., 2013), this 
work draws from a literature review and, most impor-
tantly, direct conversations with investors, insurers, 
researchers, and financiers participating in workshops 
focused on investments in green infrastructure projects 
and related risks (CPI, CBI, 2012), and on the key issues 
that a policy risk insurance facility should be able to 
face.
2 Definitions and challenges of 
policy risk
Policy risk, in the form of retroactive changes to 
policies that financially support investment, has 
emerged as a key obstacle to private invest-
ment in the renewable energy sector.
Policy risk concerns the possibility that national 
governments — acting in their sovereign capacity 
— amend policy environments in ways that adversely 
impact the financial stability of renewable energy 
projects. 
We define two main types of policy risks:
 • Prospective policy risk refers to the overall 
uncertainty and instability of the regulatory 
framework (i.e. frequent, unpredictable, 
and irregular changes in the policy), which 
negatively influences the planning of new 
projects, resulting in higher rates of return 
required by investors. For example frequent 
changes of legislation in Italy, such as a plan 
(“Quarto Conto Energia”) introduced in 2011 for a 
revision of solar photovoltaic tariffs up to 2016, 
followed in 2012 by a new law introducing a new 
revision of tariffs, have resulted in an uncertain 
outlook for the photovoltaic solar sector (EPIA, 
2012).
 • Retroactive policy risk refers to policy or 
regulatory changes which adversely affect the 
financial stability of existing projects. Spain 
and most recently Bulgaria provide examples 
of where retroactive policy changes have 
negatively affected investment environments 
for renewable energy. In December 2010 Spain 
of public budget (Abos, 2012; Wilkins, 2012); (3) Countries are subject to 
economic restrictions; (4) Countries are more generally subject to political 
instability (i.e. frequent government changes).
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introduced two royal decrees terminating the 
right of subsidization after a project’s 28th year 
and slashing the entire industry’s tariffs by 10% 
and 30% for existing projects until 2014 (Green 
World Investor, 2010 and 2011). In 2012, the 
Bulgarian state regulator has introduced a ret-
roactive renewable energy grid fee proportional 
to the amount of the feed-in-tariff received. The 
fee will penalize, in particular, solar photovoltaic 
operators, who will have to pay back up to 39% 
of their feed-in tariffs (PV Magazine, 2012a; 
BPVA, 2012).
Of the two types of policy risk, retroactive changes 
appear to be investors’ main concern because they 
directly impact projects’ expected revenues and lower 
investor confidence about the stability of the financial 
support available over the investment’s lifetime (see 
Box 1 for an estimate of the impact of policy risk on 
investors). An unexpected change in the level of support 
can compromise projects’ ability to service debt and 
increase the cost of capital when refinancing (Abos, 
2012; Varadarajan et al., 2011). It can also carry poten-
tially high litigation costs (Green World Investor, 2010).4 
4 In response to the changes in the FiT regimes observed in Europe, several 
companies have filed complaints for the breach of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties or multilateral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
Measures interfering with the amount, or the duration, of the price support 
are likely to be challenged as a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) standard, interpreted as a protection of investor’s legitimate ex-
pectations based on the principles of the state ensuring a stable business 
environment. (IISD, 2012)
In particular, retroactive changes to Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) 
regimes constitute the focus of our analysis in this 
paper, regardless of whether they are agreed on bilat-
erally or specified by laws or decrees. In our charac-
terization of Feed-in-Tariff changes we include direct 
mandatory changes to the stated level of the tariffs, and 
also indirect acts such as the introduction of a retroac-
tive connection fee for those benefitting from the tariff.
Box 1. Estimates of the financial impact of policy risk.
A study by the Institute for Economy and the Environment for the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2011b; Müller et al, 2011; Lüthi, Wüstenhagen, 2012), based on conjoint analysis methodology simulating 
preferences over real decision situations between different investment possibilities, attempted to 
assess the willingness of business to accept risks related to policy changes impacting renewable 
energy subsidies by estimating the risk premium that investors would require to accept such changes. 
According to the study, a 50% risk of changing support to FiT within the next two years could be 
compensated by a risk premium of about 10 USDc/kWh (or 43% of the highest premium obtainable). In 
another study, Climate Policy Initiative (Varadarajan et al., 2011) analysed the impact of policy changes 
on generation costs in six renewable projects in Europe and the United States. Climate Policy Initiative 
found that financing costs increase by 11-15% of the cost of renewable electricity generation if policy 
support is reduced by 10 years, while a shift from a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) or power purchase agreement 
(PPA) to a combination of a Feed-in-Premium (FiP) plus market prices (normalized to maintain equity 
returns), leads to additional financing costs of 4-11% (Varadarajan et al., 2011).
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3 Existing instruments for the 
mitigation of policy risk
While not specifically designed to cover policy risk, 
some examples of established political risk insurance 
products and guarantees have been used to some 
extent to protect against retroactive changes to revenue 
support policies. These can provide insights to inform 
the design of new dedicated instruments (e.g. including 
the OPIC FiT insurance discussed in chapter 4). We 
focus here only on instruments offered by the public 
sector as evidence suggests that new products and 
solutions for policy risks need (at least initially) to come 
from public institutions.5 In particular, we discuss polit-
ical risk insurances from MIGA and OPIC in section 3.1 
and partial risk guarantees offered by the World Bank in 
section 3.2.
3.1 MIGA and OPIC political risk insurance 
instruments
Political risk insurance instruments can partially 
cover the impact of policy change, providing that the 
change qualifies as an expropriatory breach of inves-
tor’s rights. For clarity, with expropriation under these 
insurance contracts we refer to government measures, 
including policy changes, which deprive investors of 
their main rights to operate the asset and to receive 
compensation for their services, jeopardizing the profit-
ability of their investments and leading to a confiscatory 
effect that essentially forces them to abandon their 
venture.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), a World Bank Group agency established in 
1988 to offer political risk insurance to investors in the 
poorest countries, can cover a tariff reduction for the 
equity and debt provider6 if the client can prove that 
the change qualifies as an expropriatory change in the 
regulatory scheme (MIGA, 2012f), or as an expropria-
tory breach of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) 
between the investor and the public off-taker.7 Similarly, 
5 During our consultations, private insurers (CBI, CPI, 2012; UNEP, Parhelion, 
2012) have expressed a high degree of skepticism regarding their ability to 
provide coverage for the legitimate actions of governments, unless there is 
a sufficient alignment of interest with the host government.
6 MIGA covers up to 90% of equity investments, plus an additional 500% 
as a contribution for earnings’ losses attributable to the investment; for 
loans, the guarantee rises to up to 95% of the principal, plus 135% of the 
principal to cover accrued interests’ loss (MIGA, 2012b).
7 A IEG-WB report shows the case, in 2000, of a local government in an 
African country attempting to revise a PPA with a geothermal power plant 
which was insured against expropriatory breach of contract. Strong efforts 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
provides policy risk coverage8 to US investors when the 
policy change causes a breach of the PPA and consti-
tutes an expropriation of investors’ rights (or regulatory 
taking) originating from the contract.9 
Nevertheless, according to practitioners, a signifi-
cant degree of uncertainty around the approval of 
each claim and the timing and requirements of the 
procedures for political risk insurance instruments, 
seem to have prevented their wider utilization (UNEP, 
Parhelion, 2012). Data from MIGA and OPIC show 
that timing10 for reimbursement may vary significantly, 
ranging from one to almost five years depending on 
efforts to find amicable solutions.
More importantly, from an investor’ point of view, the 
change of policy does not trigger a systematic applica-
tion of the coverage, and it is the client’s responsibility 
to demonstrate that the specific policy change caused 
an expropriatory violation of an existing contract 
by MIGA in facilitating negotiations over 5 years, aimed at allowing the 
investor to keep its project running, resulted in the public off-taker even-
tually agreeing to honor the existing contract (IEG-WB, 2010). MIGA also 
covers non-expropriatory breach of contract, in case of denial of justice, 
arbitral award default, or when the Government renders the Dispute Res-
olution Procedure impossible, hazardous or commercially impracticable to 
proceed (MIGA, 2011a).
8 OPIC can insure up to 90% of an equity investment, plus an additional 
180% to cover future earnings; for third party loans coverage is 100% of 
principal and interest (OPIC, 2012g). 
9 OPIC has paid claims following violation of contract due to a change in 
legislation. In the case of Ponderosa Project in Argentina OPIC determined 
that a change in the legislation of the Government of Argentina under its 
sovereign capacity (Emergency Law) had resulted in a repudiation of a 
contractual obligation with the foreign company, depriving the investor of 
its rights in the insured investment (expropriatory effect) for more than 
six months. OPIC accepted the claim of the investor paying the amount of 
the insured investment (USD 50 million) (OPIC, 2005). OPIC has also paid 
similar claims in other cases such as MidAmerican in Indonesia, Bank of 
America- Dabhol project in India (OPIC, 2012f).
10 MIGA aims to provide compensation within 6-14 months following the 
date of loss (MIGA, 2011a). Historical evidence made available by the 
Agency (MIGA, 2012c) shows that so far claims have been paid after 2-3 
years from the event date, and no later than one year from the date of 
claim’s submission. Timing is strongly influenced by MIGA’s pre-claim 
efforts to facilitate negotiations for reaching amicable settlement of 
disputes (MIGA, 2012f), which aim at preserving both the value for the 
investor and projects’ constant contribution to the local economy (MIGA, 
2012d). Such pre-claim efforts can only be undertaken with the participa-
tion and consent of the claimants (MIGA, 2012f). OPIC data based on 13 
available observations (OPIC, 2012e), out of about 70 projects determined 
under total expropriation clause show that claims are resolved on average 
3.5 years after the event date and 1.5 years from claim’s submission. 
Timing of reimbursement process is uncertain and varies significantly from 
case to case. 
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(OPIC, 2012d).11 In this context, a clearly written con-
tract that safeguards the agreed-upon tariffs and 
related obligations is a necessary precondition to initiate 
this remedy, but it requires significant negotiation skills 
and legal expertise, which not all project developers 
have.
3.2 The World Bank’s partial risk 
guarantee 
Partial risk guarantees offer risk mitigation to the 
private sector for specific government obligations con-
tained in laws, regulations and agreements. They can 
thus cover a retroactive policy change if it is explicitly 
included in the guarantee’s clauses.
Partial risk guarantees were introduced by the World 
Bank in 1994 to support the mobilization of commercial 
debt during the initial phase of infrastructure projects 
in developing countries. Risks that can be mitigated 
include, among others, changes in law, expropriation or 
breach of “quiet enjoyment” of the site, and payment 
default by the national power company under the power 
purchase agreement. 
Partial risk guarantees can be used to guarantee full 
debt-servicing payments of a debt tranche (WB, 2012b) 
by covering commercial debt instruments against 
changes to specific sovereign contractual obligations 
to the private sector investor (commercial and other 
project-related risks are not covered). Partial risk guar-
antees are three-party agreements under which the 
World Bank issues a guarantee to a commercial lender 
and signs an indemnity agreement (a counter-guaran-
tee) with the host country (Mostert, 2010). By wrapping 
the government into the deal, with the World Bank 
playing the role of debt payment guarantor and enforcer 
of the government’s compliance to its commitments, 
the instrument provides significant comfort to project 
lenders and sponsors. Payment is made if the debt 
default is caused by risks specified under the guaran-
tee commitment of the host country (Matsukawa et 
al., 2007), including those affecting the stability of the 
agreed regulatory framework, such as a FiT scheme 
(Mostert, 2010).12
11 Clients have to demonstrate that policy change, while possibly not 
discriminatory in face, is discriminatory in substance, or that it has been 
implemented for non-commercial reasons (OPIC, 2005). 
12 In 2005 the World Bank has approved a partial risk guarantee for a Hydro-
electric Project in Sierra Leone. The partial risk guarantee covered, among 
others, defaults of the project developer (borrower) in the scheduled 
payment of principal and interest resulting from a breach of PPA by the 
public off-taker caused by a change in law - or breach of the government 
guarantee obligations under the PPA (WB, 2005).
However, a number of factors have limited a greater 
adoption of partial risk guarantees, which have only 
been issued 23 times since their inception (eight 
times for renewable energy projects) (WB, 2012c). 
The World Bank’s choice in the past to promote the 
use of partial risk guarantees mainly for large and 
complex projects (such as large hydro investments 
and cross-border projects) (WB, 2013), along with the 
need for an indemnity agreement from the host govern-
ment, not necessary in the case of insurance (MIGA, 
2012b), have increased market perceptions about 
product complexity, length of procedures and associ-
ated transaction costs (Parhelion, 2012). Furthermore, 
partial risk guarantees directly cover only debt holders, 
while tariff reductions usually affect many other parties 
including equity owners, providers of operations and 
maintenance services. This last issue can be addressed 
by complementing the instrument with other insurance 
tools and guarantees, such as MIGA insurance,13 albeit 
at increased complexity and transaction costs.
Interestingly, the World Bank has noted an increase 
in demand for the partial risk guarantee instrument 
in recent years, especially in the energy sector, and 
is striving to extend the scope of this instrument to 
smaller projects and programs of activities.
13 An example of a quite effective approach is Kenya’s Independent Power 
Producer Project in 2012 with a structure combining a partial risk guaran-
tee with a MIGA guarantee. The partial risk guarantee covers a letter of 
credit provided by a commercial bank (the short-term debt holder) which 
can be drawn in case of a PPA payment default from the off-taker to the 
project company. Once this partial risk guarantee is depleted, the holders 
of equity shares and outstanding commercial loans can seek coverage 
from MIGA’s Breach of Contract guarantees that insures the risk of termi-
nation of payment obligations by the off-taker under the PPA and the risk 
of default by the Government of Kenya under its Letter of Support (MIGA, 
2012f; WB, 2012d).
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4 A new instrument for 
addressing policy risk: 
OPIC FiT insurance
OPIC FiT insurance directly covers retroac-
tive changes to FiTs that affect the economic 
viability of projects financed by US investors in 
developing economies. It provides more direct 
coverage of both extreme and marginal policy 
changes, aims to improve timing of compensa-
tion, and provides more certain remedies.
With the aim of addressing some of the limits charac-
terizing currently available instruments, in 2010 OPIC 
launched a new complementary insurance product 
which specifically addresses retroactive policy changes 
to FiTs in developing economies (Project Finance, 2012). 
OPIC identifies ‘policy risk’ as an enhancement of its 
existing expropriation clause, and has enlarged the 
scope of insurance to include:
 • total expropriation covering investment losses14 
that result from significant FiT reductions which 
jeopardize the overall commercial viability of the 
project (OPIC, 2011); and
 • partial expropriation covering business income 
losses15 for a period of one to two years.16 The 
purpose is to allow project owners the time to 
restructure the project’s finance in agreement 
with lenders and authorities (Project Finance, 
2012; OPIC, 2012a, 2012b). If restructuring is 
not successful within the two-year period the 
client may then apply for total compensation.
To be eligible, projects must be assessed commercially 
viable and have a well-structured PPA in place with a 
public off-taker at a guaranteed FiT rate. This is neces-
sary for any subsequent policy changes to be configured 
as breaches of contract (OPIC, 2012a).17 Claims are 
14 Computed as the project’s book value on the day before the policy change 
occurs.
15 The difference between revenues at the predefined FiT and returns at the 
revised FiT. 
16 Provided that the amount does not exceed the book value of the invest-
ment (OPIC, 2012b).
17 Desirable features for the PPA are: a) Clear obligation to take the power 
delivered, b) Fixed tariff rate based on cost of power generation plus 
reasonable rate of return, c) Guaranteed grid connection, d) Adequate 
term for cost recovery (15-20 years), e) Tariff payments linked to currency 
of project debt, f) Acceptable dispute resolution mechanism, g) Off-taker 
expected to be resolved within seven to 15 months from 
the effective date of political action or decree (OPIC, 
2012b).18
Figure 1 illustrates the interactions between the dif-
ferent actors involved in the mechanism. The Foreign 
Enterprise operating the project — directly or indirectly 
owned by US equity holders — signs a PPA contract 
with the Foreign Governing Authority at a guaranteed 
long-term FiT rate (Project Finance, 2012; OPIC, 2012a). 
OPIC offers insurance covering up to 90% of the 
investor’s share in the foreign enterprise.19 If an adverse 
FiT revision occurs, breaching the tariff clause in the 
PPA, clients must inform OPIC and seek redress from 
the host government to undo its actions (OPIC, 2012f) 
before they submit a claim.20 If OPIC accepts the claim, 
it pays compensation to the investor and acquires all 
rights in the project’s economics. With these in hand, 
OPIC then pursues the local government for redress 
(OPIC, 2012b). OPIC has approximately USD five billion 
in reserves with which to pay claims, and is also guaran-
teed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government 
(OPIC, 2012f).
accepts change in law risk, h) Acceptable force majeure provision excusing 
performance, i) Acceptable termination provisions, j) Ability to assign PPA 
as collateral (OPIC, 2012a).
18 Claims can be submitted once a FiT revision is enforced for 6 consecutive 
months without an adequate compensation by the local authorities.
19 The product does not cover future revenues.
20 OPIC does not require that the investor go to arbitration or utilize other 
dispute resolution procedures (OPIC, 2012f). 
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5 Key lessons for an effective 
policy risk insurance
To be effective, policy risk insurance 
instruments should:
• streamline and systematically define the 
risk and the conditions for coverage;
• be backed with strong enforcement 
power from the insurance provider;
• include developed markets and smaller 
projects;
• reduce transaction costs implied by 
currently available instruments, and
• improve project’s creditworthiness.
One-on-one interviews and other engagements with 
stakeholders including practitioners, investors, and 
insurers, as well as a review of the relevant literature, 
helped us identify lessons for designing an effective 
policy risk insurance mechanism. We summarize these 
lessons here, focusing on the mechanisms addressing 
FiT policy changes.
5.1 Promoting systematic and streamlined 
protection 
In order to facilitate the systematic application of 
the coverage once policy changes occur, insurance 
instruments should contain a clear characterization of 
policy risk, and clearly identify which negative changes 
in the support policies could be classified as violations, 
breaches, or expropriation of pre-existing obligations.21 
Conversely, the client has the burden of demonstrating 
that the specific policy change represents violations of 
contractual obligations (OPIC, 2012d). 
Policy insurance should be supported by well-drafted 
and effective contracts that clearly articulate the level 
of support to which the government has committed. 
This is often true for FiT schemes, whose specifications 
are normally detailed in the long-term contracts and 
purchase agreements (Couture et al., 2010) governing 
the sale of the electricity generated from the projects 
to off-takers or back to the grid (NERSA, 2009; OPIC, 
2012b). However, policy change can take different and 
more articulate and creative forms,22 hence challenging 
21 The specific mandate for climate-change policies of the new OPIC FiT 
insurance is the first of its kind. Other insurance providers such as MIGA, 
for example, lack a specific strategy to cover climate related investments 
(Venugopal et al., 2012).
22 Such as a new connection fee, as in the case of Bulgaria (please see 
chapter 2 for reference).
Figure 1 - Stakeholder mapping for the OPIC feed-in tariff insurance (as of June 2012)
US GovernmentForeign Governing
Authority
Project Financing
US Investor  
Shareholder  
equity  
US Gov’t  
Authority  guarantee  
Lo cal Ban k s  
Banks  
loan  
Otaker  
Public Utility  PPA  
FiT  
Fo reign   
En terp rise 
recovery  
Regu lato r 
 Local Authority  
OPIC  
Agency (US)  
premium  
income  insurance
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both investors and insurance providers on drafting com-
plete and effective contracts.
5.2 Ensuring the backing of strong 
enforcement powers and alignment of 
interest
For policy risk insurance to be effective, providers 
should have a strong enforcement power over govern-
ments. This involves the ability to discourage political 
decisions that revoke previous commitments, or in the 
event of such decisions, the ability to enforce remedies 
against public authorities. 
For this purpose, public providers are better placed 
than the private sector when it comes to discipline 
and influence governments’ legitimate (although 
harmful) retroactive decisions. MIGA and OPIC, for 
example, have demonstrated capacity to enforce politi-
cal risk insurance as their ties with the World Bank and 
the US Government respectively, appear to have signifi-
cantly limited moral hazard behaviors by host countries, 
namely the situation in which an agent (such as a gov-
ernment) is incentivized to behave in an opportunistic 
or riskier way as the negative effects of her actions are 
covered by an insurance. MIGA has paid out only six 
claims from more than 620 guaranteed projects. Of the 
292 claim settlements disbursed to its investors since 
1971 (OPIC, 2012h), we estimate OPIC has recovered up 
to 92% from host governments. Similarly, for partial risk 
guarantees, the pressure to avoid triggering a repay-
ment claim with the World Bank – with the high visibility 
this event entails - induces host governments to honour 
their sovereign contractual obligations (WB, 2013).
Conversely, the many private insurers already present 
in the political risk insurance landscape23 are less 
likely to offer policy risk coverage in the absence of 
underwriting data to help assess and price this type of 
risk, such as ratings and rankings of countries’ regula-
tory framework stability (CBI, CPI, 2012). In addition, 
it is usually difficult for private insurers to meet, or 
better, the very long coverage tenors required by project 
developers and already offered by MIGA and OPIC,24 as 
they operate under a different business model (MIGA, 
2012f) and a different mandate than those of publicly 
backed entities.
23 Gordon (2008) surveyed 63 private political risk insurers with accessible 
websites (four of them only provide consulting services. 82 private and 
public PRIs are listed on MIGA’s PRI Center website (PRI Center, 2012)
24 Both MIGA and OPIC offer coverage for up to 20 years of project life. 
5.3 Extending scope and coverage
To increase their effectiveness and value, policy insur-
ance mechanisms should expand coverage to a wider 
range of policies. If, on one hand, feed-in tariff insur-
ance represents a significant achievement in terms of 
mainstreaming insurance protection related to a specific 
policy, on the other hand, such an insurance instrument 
would be more effective and valuable if it is able to 
cover other policy instruments, and deal with cross-bor-
ders variations as well (Parhelion, 2012).
The availability of insurance solutions for policy risk 
mitigation needs to be significantly expanded across 
countries. Both OPIC and MIGA products cover only 
developing economies and emerging markets, but the 
perception of policy risk has increased significantly in 
some developed countries as well. Furthermore, OPIC 
provides coverage for US investors and project develop-
ers only,25 while MIGA Expropriation Coverage protec-
tion does not extend to cover local project developers. 
In this regard, the industry has put forward multi-gov-
ernment co-insurance schemes26 as a suitable 
instrument for providers of policy risk insurance in 
developed countries where the scope for action of 
multilateral development banks is limited (CBI, CPI, 
2012). A group of governments would provide the 
financial backing of a pooled insurance scheme aimed at 
protecting investors from policy changes by those same 
governments.27 This would have the additional outcome 
of actually aligning the interests of the risk provider 
and the risk influencer under the same entity. However, 
without sufficient enforcement power over govern-
ments responsible for policy change, or some ability to 
seek redress from non-compliant governments, moral 
hazard behavior would likely represent a serious threat 
to the effectiveness of the scheme.28
25 Conditions for project eligibility are project ownership by a US citizen or 
by a US corporation with more than 50% interest owned by US citizens, or 
a foreign corporation  with more than 95% of interest owned by any of the 
previous entities (Project Finance, 2012). 
26 Ideally assisted by multilateral development banks or supranational 
institutions, and possibly involving the participation of private insurers.
27 A similar structure for the coverage of catastrophe risks from extreme 
events has been set up by a coalition of governments in the Caribbean, the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. The facility took 2 years of 
design and negotiation efforts with issues of reciprocal trust between the 
governments arising along the process. 
28 Knowing that most affected parties will be compensated by insurance, 
and that the cost of this insurance is shared across different parties, a 
single government may perceive an advantage in non-complying with its 
commitments and benefit from insurance provided by other countries. To 
mitigate this risk the facility may, for example, force this government to 
sustain a first tranche of the losses or to impose penalties and higher costs 
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5.4 Reducing costs, complexity, 
and compensation time through 
standardization
The existing instruments have costly compliance 
requirements, which limit their application to large 
(and well-resourced) projects only. The instruments 
are largely unaffordable for smaller projects and pro-
grams dedicated to wide-spread, small-scale installa-
tions (UNEP, Parhelion, 2012) due to high costs implied 
by complex negotiating and drafting processes, the 
availability of resources needed to seek justice locally, 
and the need to keep investments solvent before com-
pensation is paid.
It is difficult to define the exact cost of providing policy 
risk insurance, as it varies from country to country. 
However, two main cost components are common to all 
insurance structures: 
 • Explicit costs, or known costs, relate to the 
premium itself. The lack of track records 
specific to policy risk (the “loss histories”) 
makes it difficult for insurers to price this risk 
— a concern expressed in particular by private 
insurers. As a general rule, those providers 
who currently price this risk link it to the host 
country’s political history and stability (OPIC, 
2012d; WB, 2013). The development of more 
products and expertise in the sector will, 
naturally, increase the accuracy of the pricing 
and, if more providers enter the market, make it 
more competitive.
 • Implicit costs refer to the transaction costs 
related to the insurance: negotiation and 
drafting of PPAs, claim filing procedures, 
self-insurance,29 and eligibility conditions. 
While aimed at discouraging investors’ moral 
hazard, and increasing the chances of the 
insurer to receive compensation from the host 
government (OPIC, 2012d), they increase the 
overall costs of the instrument for the end user 
and impact the certainty of the coverage.30
to its participation in the scheme (CPI, CBI, 2012).
29 This is the amount of losses that the insured party has to sustain before 
the insurer pays any compensation.
30 For a single project developer, drafting PPAs to ensure that adverse policy 
changes will systematically trigger breach of contract requires expertise 
and further increases transaction costs (UNEP, Parhelion, 2012). Nego-
tiations of the PPA can last a very long time, determining an increase of 
overall project costs. This is the case, for example, of Lake Turkana project 
(WB, 2011), where negotiations lasted 4 years despite the financially 
soundness of the off-taker (WEF, 2012). In general PPAs need to be 
assessed taking into account the sustainability of the off-taker in the long 
Importantly, efforts to streamline the adoption of 
standardized clauses, procedures, and documenta-
tion would reduce implicit costs and accelerate the 
verification and settlement of claims. OPIC FiT seems 
to move in the right direction by not only formally 
recognizing retroactive FiT change as a specific clause 
within expropriation, but also by setting the contrac-
tual requirements for eligible PPAs before coverage is 
granted. This clarity is necessary to ensure contract 
effectiveness and strengthen its enforcement in case of 
litigation. 
To speed up the proliferation of these kinds of instru-
ments, international agencies providing them could 
encourage the adoption of standardized PPAs that 
meet all requirements (Couture et al. 2010). A stan-
dardized PPA, such as that proposed under an initiative 
of the World Economic Forum and being currently 
tested in Kenya, would reduce the complexity of 
negotiations which would, in turn, reduce time, costs 
and uncertainty, encouraging wider deployment (WEF, 
2012).31 Nonetheless, previous attempts to harmonize 
PPA specifications across different countries as in the 
Global Africa Power (GAP) initiative have proved chal-
lenging and faced strong resistance from local authori-
ties (UNEP, Parhelion, 2012).
5.5 Engaging credit rating agencies to 
promote a transformative impact on 
financial investors’ behavior 
To unlock the level of finance needed to drive a sys-
temic and transformative change in green infrastruc-
ture investing, policy risk insurances need to improve 
underlying projects’ credit worthiness as assessed 
by credit rating agencies. Notwithstanding the many 
circumstances that affect banks and institutional inves-
tors’ decisions to commit resources to green projects, 
Standard & Poor’s has summarized the key barriers 
for large-scale, low-carbon investments as “the small 
[size of the] secondary debt market, [and the] absence 
of liquid, investment grade asset-backed securities” 
(Wilkins, 2012). Since most institutional investors seem 
to rely on credit rating for their investment decisions, 
the ability of policy risk insurance to improve project 
ratings becomes relevant for the product’s overall effec-
tiveness, just as the stability of the policy framework 
run (MIGA, 2012f).
31 If standardization receives widespread agreement, it may also reduce 
explicit costs, such as premium rates. When a new policy is done, insur-
ance pricing is high because the policy is new and related uncertainty is 
significant (Sirr, 2012).
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and sovereign credit rating is a key driver of project’s 
credit worthiness (S&P, 2007).32
However, certain features of policy risk insurance 
may fall short of improving credit worthiness from 
the bondholders’ perspective, as assessed by credit 
rating agencies. From the latter’s perspective indeed, 
once the unfavorable event occurs a significant degree 
of uncertainty remains on whether the insurance will 
cover losses, and on the timing and amount of the final 
compensation. This translates into high uncertainty over 
the project’s ability to service its debt obligations. For 
these reasons, when assessing the credit worthiness 
of a security, rating agencies have a strong tendency to 
demand a “pay first, investigate later” approach, as in 
the case of the full financial guarantee offered by mono-
line insurers. 
On the other hand, insurance providers ask rating 
agencies to expand the scope of their methodol-
ogy to include the impact of all available mitigation 
instruments (beyond the straightforward insurance 
of lenders’ cash-flows) able to improve the overall 
risk profile of the project33 (Sirr, 2012). The new partial 
expropriation feature of OPIC FiT, while not designed 
with the specific objective of improving ratings, is 
specifically geared to shorten lag-times and improve 
prospects for refinancing, and should be well received 
by rating agencies (OPIC, 2012a).34 
Notwithstanding these issues, the recognition of 
political risk insurance and risk guarantees as credit 
enhancement tools (especially for emerging market 
debt) offers a useful precedent in the right direction 
for policy risk insurance.35 We note in fact that, as a 
general rule, without political risk coverage, invest-
ment ratings are strongly constrained by the host 
country perceived risks (MIGA, 2012a). Besides, for 
projects in high-risk countries, lenders and inves-
tors frequently demand political risk coverage as a 
32 More significantly so whenever the government is also an off-taker of the 
project’s output.
33 A lot of risk management work for the whole project- for example – is 
done in construction insurance lowering the probability of occurrence and 
expected severity of losses from construction risks (Sirr, 2012).
34 Under partial expropriation coverage, policy risk is partially mitigated by 
the possibility of restructuring project’s financing in order to preserve its 
economic viability under the new FiT.
35 Meaningful is the case of MSF Holding in 2000, a Brazilian loan and lease 
company financer of medical equipment which, after purchasing a MIGA 
guarantee against Transfer Restrictions and Expropriation of Funds, got an 
unprecedent 6 notches rating enhancement above the Brazilian sovereign 
rating, from the three main rating agencies (Fitch, S&P and Moody’s) 
(MIGA, 2005).
necessary pre-condition for their involvement (OPIC, 
2012d). Finally, the ability of publicly-backed political 
risk insurers to provide coverage with terms longer 
than the typical maturity of project loans (five to seven 
years) significantly improves projects’ creditworthiness 
(Venugopal et al., 2012).
6 Final remarks
At present, policy risk in developing countries is, 
to some extent, covered by partial risk guarantees 
and political risk insurance (expropriation coverage) 
offered by organizations such as The World Bank, 
MIGA, and OPIC, whose public nature and strong 
government backing improves their ability to enforce 
remedies against host governments. However, related 
uncertainties about timing of compensation, signifi-
cant transaction costs, and compliance requirements 
on the insured party reduce the ability of these instru-
ments to address policy risk and limit their scope to 
medium and large projects only.
Building on the positive features and the limits of those 
political risk insurance products, the design of ded-
icated instruments, such as policy risk insurance is 
a step in the right direction. Furthermore, efforts to 
streamline and standardize procedures and contracts 
could significantly enhance certainty and improve the 
timeliness of remedies. The new FiT insurance cov-
erage recently launched by OPIC (the OPIC FiT), for 
example, improves the expropriation clause of political 
risk insurance by providing direct coverage for retroac-
tive changes to national policies that would harm the 
financial stability of existing projects. The product also 
aims at standardizing documentation and procedures by 
setting upfront the guidelines for the eligible PPAs.
However, more needs to be done to extend coverage 
of instruments to developed countries, and to bridge 
the gap between the coverage demanded by investors 
and the coverage supplied by available instruments. 
In particular, letting credit rating agencies acknowledge 
the ability of policy risk insurance in improving invest-
ments’ creditworthiness will be crucial to unlock the full 
transformative impact of these instruments in changing 
mainstream institutional investors’ behavior towards 
green infrastructure investments.
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